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I. INTRODUCTION 
No study of two sayings from the synoptic tradition can completely account 
for the position that Jesus took on the Law, but for a number of reasons Mark 
10:9 and 2:27 can provide the basis for a possible way forward. Although 
occasionally disputed, both sayings have strong claims to authenticity.! Each 
impinges on a different part of the Law. Both sayings contain a prescription, as 
well as the justification for the demand made, thereby reducing the amount of 
speculation necessary in reconstructing the logic of Jesus' demand 2 And 
together they illustrate one of the central difficulties in accounting for Jesus' 
attitude toward the Law. 
Nonetheless, existing paradigms for explaining the approach taken to the Law 
by Jesus have failed to account for these sayings and those like them in the syn-
optic tradition. For example, it has been argued that Jesus describes the real 
meaning of the Sabbath in Mark 2:27.3 But that cannot be said of Jesus' treat-
ment of the so-called divorce provision in Mark 10:9. There Jesus appears to set 
the Law aside, rather than define its real meaning. 
Alternatively, one might argue, as does Marcus Borg, that Jesus' approach is 
dictated by a hermeneutics of mercy4 However, in so doing Borg is forced to 
argue that Jesus' comment on divorce was initiated by his contemporaries and, as 
a result, he relies heavily upon the secondary features of the account. 
Furthermore, he makes no attempt to explain how it is that Jesus' view of the 
divorce question can be understood in terms of a concern for mercy. 
Yet another alternative has been to combine the two models and to argue 
that Jesus at times "abrogates" the Law and, at other times, insists upon observing 
its "true meaning."s But this, like the argument that Jesus exercises his sovereignty 
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over the Law, only begs the larger questions: Was jesus inconsistent in his approach to 
the Law," or is the consistency he practices foreign to our own, cu lturally conditioned 
notions of what constitutes consistency?, If he was inconsistent by our standards and 
his, can patterns be isolated which account for at least parts of his approach? If not, on 
what basis did jesus take first one approach to the Law and then another? 
Together, then, these passages illustrate the difficulties in using some of the existing 
paradigms for understanding the problem of jesus' attitude toward the Law. For the 
same reasons, however, they also provide possible windows to the unifying "logic" 
behind part of his demands. 
II. TORAH: A PARADIGM OF ITS USE 
Accordingly we will offer an alternative paradigm; suggest other points of contact 
with the synoptic tradition; and assess the significance of the paradigm, using the 
insights of comparative religious ethics. Then we will consider where the approach 
taken by jesus might be located in a schema for charting jewish approaches to the 
Law. In closing we will identify two important implications of the results described 
here. 
A The Law, Emptied of Continued Relevance 
As described in Mark 10:9, jesus must have been aware of the fact that his 
demand impinges upon the provision for divorce in Deut 24: I. Nonetheless, he 
makes no direct reference to it. He does not refer to it in order to endorse its continu-
ing validity or to assess its meaning and appropriate application. Nor does he directly 
forbid his hearers to avail themselves of the provision.8 Instead, the logion takes the 
form of a single-stranded mashal with a nuance which is far more difficult to define.9 
As it appears in the Creek of Mark's gospel, the saying derives much of its prescrip-
tive force from the use of me with the subjunctive mood verb, XffiptS£-tffi. There are 
other features too that contribute to this impression: It is terse. The subjects and verbs 
of both clauses are arranged in antithesis to one another: 0£o<; -
- Xffiptsbffi. And the relative clause is placed in an advanced position in 
the sentence. In this way, the act of man ·'putting asunder is placed in sharp contrast 
with the act of Cod "joining together." 
There are few who would disagree about the interpretation of the second clause. It 
is a simple, unconditional prohibition of divorce. ' 0 However, by referring to that which 
Cod has "joined together," the first clause elicits assent to the notion that marriage is 
divinely instituted and, by implication, calls for a pattern of behavior which accords 
with that understanding. 
In other words, the logion does not simply call for the hearer to refrain from invok-
ing the provision for divorce. It calls for a pattern of response which takes seriously 
the character of marriage as divinely instituted." As a result the provision for divorce 
is not directly rescinded. Instead, it is emptied of any continued relevance .'2 
B. The Law, A Summons to Free Fulfillment 
Significant features of the demand in Mark 2:27 closely approximate basic features of 
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the logion in Mark 10:9. As in Mark 10:9, Jesus must have been aware that his own 
demand impinged upon the demand made by Torah. In spite of this he does not 
appeal for an approach to Sabbath observance on the basis of the Law itself. Nor does 
he explicitly summon those who hear him to abandon observing the Law. Instead, he 
simply advances his own demand. As in Mark 10:9, the demand also begins with a 
reference to the creative intent of God and, again, takes the form of an antithesis. 
In Mark 2:27, however, the contrast is sharper and has a different significance. This 
is due in part to the fact that, unlike Mark 10:9, both clauses are of equal grammatical 
value. The main clause to; DUX 'tov u'v8po)1!oV i:Yfvf1:0 is juxtaposed with 
the nominal clause OUX 6 u'V8pCOTCOV DtU 'tov The Sabbath is also the 
subject of both clauses, and this strengthens the contrast. Whereas in Mark 10:9 mar-
riage is the subject of the first clause and divorce the subject of the second. 
These are differences of considerable significance. For while both divorce and 
Sabbath observance are thereby set against the background of God's will as creator, 
the effect is not the same. The provision for divorce, as we have seen, is emptied of 
continued relevance. Framed as his demand is in Mark 2:27, Jesus summons his hearers 
to a "free fulfillment" of the Sabbath. 13 
Accordingly, Jesus provides no clue to the specific nature of the response expected. 
Instead, he confines himself to characterizing the Sabbath as God's gift to Israel and, 
only as the Sabbath is observed as gift, is the end for which it was intended realized. 
As Robert Tannehill notes: 
The lack of concern with qualifications and with the practical problem of estab-
lishing rules of behavior is quite apparent as soon as one considers the implica-
tions of such a saying within the context of Jewish piety. The saying does not 
spell out a rule which will directly solve questions of how to behave on the sab-
bath. Starting from this aphorism various practical conclusions could be reached, 
from an almost total disregard of the sabbath law because of human need to 
observance of the sabbath law except in unusual cases, since the sabbath is good 
for man. The aphorism does not predetermine the conclusion but requires the 
hearer to think about these things in a radical way. 14 
C. Other Points of Contact in the Synoptic Tradition 
Together, these two patterns provide a paradigm which can be applied to authentic 
traditions elsewhere in the gospels. The first, second, and fourth of the so-called 
antitheses found in Matt 5:21-48 provide an example. I \ 
1. The Antitheses 
Here Jesus is described as juxtaposing his own demand with that of Torah. He 
introduces his demands in language which is without substantive parallel; and he does 
so without customary recourse to other parts of the Law. Yet, as Reinhart Hummel 
observes, the antitheses "are less antithetical in content than in form. "16 
The fourth antithesis might appear to set aside the Law, but the remaining antithe-
ses do not clearly dispense with the Decalogue. Conversely, the first and second 
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antitheses might suggest a heightening of the Law's demand. Yet the fourth antithesis 
does not heighten the Law's demand, but appears instead to supplant it. 
The relationship of Torah to the prescriptive content of Jesus' demand is then of 
greater complexity than the words "radicalization; "abrogation; or "exposition" can 
account for. The patterns of prescription are, however, very much like those which we 
have identified above in Mark I 0:9 and 2:27 
On the one hand, antitheses one (on murder) and two (on adultery) can be com-
pared with Mark 2:27. Both demands point to a wider range of attitudes and actions 
than that required by the commandments by juxtaposing an additional demand with 
Torah. So the prohibition of murder is juxtaposed with the further warning: 
nus 6 0PYLS0J.l£VOs 1:0 aO£A,cp0 aino'll 
£voxo" £<J1:aL 1:11 KP'L<J£L 
And the prohibition of adultery is juxtaposed with the words : 
n&; 6 pAfnf.OV Yl.lvalxa npos 1:0 fTCt81.lJ.l1l<JaL 
li011 fJ.l0LX£l.l<J£V atmlv 
Neither antithesis begins to spell out all of the possible actions or attitudes which are 
prohibited. To the contrary, it is impossible to specify the claims which they make. In 
this way the auditor is summoned to its free fulfillment. 
On the other hand, the fourth antithesis compares favorably with Mark 10:9. Jesus 
juxtaposes the demand for trustworthy oaths with his own prohibition of oath-taking. 
The demand for trustworthy oaths is, as a result, no longer relevant: E<J1:f.O OE 6 
A6yos UJ.lWV vat val ou ou. 
2. Mark 7:15 
One or the other part of our paradigm may also apply to still other synoptic tradi-
tions. For example, in its present setting and form, Mark 7: 15 cannot be authentic.'7 
However, it may have originally had a different form, or it may have been uttered 
under circumstances which would put the logion in a very different light. Were it pos-
sible to recover the form or reconstruct the setting, we believe that the demand would 
compare well with at least part of the paradigm described above. 
So, for example, Charles Carlston argues that the earliest and authentic form of the 
saying may have been: what truly defiles a man comes from within, not from with-
OUt."' 8 If he is right, then the Law is not set aside; instead, its free fulfillment is 
demanded. And the logion, like other parts of the synoptic tradition, conforms to a 
part of the paradigm which we have identified. 
Be that as it may, by examining those prescriptive traditions with strong claims to 
authenticity, we have identified two patterns which help to define the relationship of 
Torah to the prescriptive content of Jesus' ethic. In the space remaining, it needs to be 
asked, What ties these two parts of the paradigm together? Why does Jesus take one 
position on the Torah in Mark 10:9 and another in Mark 2:27, at times emptying the 
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law of continued relevance and at other times summoning his followers to a free ful-
fillment of God's will? Is he inconsistent, or is the consistency he practices foreign to 
our own, culturally conditioned notions of what constitutes consistency? 
III. PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION IN THE ETHICS OF JESUS 
The answer could be provided by arguing, as so many have, on the basis of coher-
ence. But this approach has bedeviled studies of the historical Jesus. Of necessity, argu-
ments from coherence begin with a given picture of the whole and then argue that 
one part or another of the tradition coheres with the larger picture that the writer has 
in mind. This approach has its advantages. However, such arguments often disregard 
the potentially diverse character of Jesus' thought and the variety of influences which 
may have shaped his thinking. Furthermore, such an approach is ultimately no more 
convincing than the extent to which one is prepared to accept a given scholar's larger 
assumptions. 
This tendency can be seen, for example, in the case which some have recently made 
for a Jesus who is a "teacher of subversive wisdom. Insisting that eschatology cannot 
account for the whole of Jesus' teaching, some have argued that the model ought to 
be completely abandoned. '9 The work of more cautious scholars suggests, however, 
that such absolute distinctions ought not to be made too quickly, or too firmly. 20 
Accordingly, the methods of comparative religious ethics are used here, believing that 
this model will allow us to analyze the use of ethical language without prejudging the 
outcome. The use of such a model also has the advantage of allowing us to study the 
use of ethical language from selected passages, without insisting on a picture of the 
whole in advance. Interpretation of the evidence will, of course, always remain a mat-
ter of debate, but in theory the use of such a method requires greater accountability 
to the evidence because it focuses upon the logic of individual demands. 
Others may question the wisdom of using a method like the one described here, 
particularly since the language of the method is patently foreign to the setting in 
which Jesus lived. Yet, like the application of other social sciences to the biblical text, 
the purpose of comparative religious ethics is not to reproduce the subject's thought-
world or thought-forms. Indeed, by using a method of this kind, we acknowledge the 
distance which exists between us and the object of study. Use of the method is also 
based upon the realization that the questions to which we seek answers may not 
have been the questions to which Jesus or his contemporaries may have addressed 
themselves. 
Nonetheless, such methods should not be allowed to force the original subject matter 
to "'say' things that are alien to its original purpose. For this reason, students of com-
parative religious ethics require that the definitions they use conform with the sub-
ject's intuitive understanding of the term and be cross-culturally applicable. A thor-
ough defense of such an approach cannot be undertaken here, but the authors of the 
method have made every effort to conform to these criteria. It has been applied to 
more than one culture, some of which are from the past. And more than one student 
of religious ethics has confirmed the model's usefulness. 21 
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A. The Logic of Religious Ethics 
The concept from comparative religious ethics which is the most helpful here is 
that of "practical justification.' In a given situation anyone making a demand must 
describe how s/ he expects an action to be performed: "What is to be done, to whom, 
in what way, under what circumstances."22 In addition, s/he may be called upon to 
give reasons for the action (or behavior) s/ he demands. 
The process of providing those reasons is called "practical justifica tion.' Although 
often unexpressed, the reasons given may, in fact, lie on one of three levels, which 
can be arranged in an appellate fashion: 21 
3. Vindication 
2. Validation 
t 
I. Principles / Rules 
t 
Situational Application 
If, for example, the speaker was called upon to justify the prescription, "do not 
strike your parents," s/he might begin with an appeal to a moral principle, such as 
"Honor your father and mother." In so doing s/he would be appealing to level one. 
Challenged, s/he may then argue that the person to whom s/he is speaking ought 
to honor her/ his parents because it is a direct commandment of the community's god. 
S/ he might also elaborate by arguing that, having accepted the premise that whoever 
has the power to create humankind has the right to be obeyed, the person to whom 
s/he is speaking is, therefore, bound by that creator's command. These appeals belong 
to level two, validation. 
Only if these last reasons were challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable would the 
speaker then be required to move to level three and to vindicate her/ his demand. The 
speaker would then need to argue by some means that it is reasonable to obey the 
creator or that there is a creator2 4 
In a religious ethic a number of statements may prove to be significant, but none is 
more important on level two (i .e., validation) than the appeal made to divine authori-
ty. Logically prior to all other demands, even the harshest or most inviting of sanctions 
are of logically secondary significance to such an appeal. Without having identified the 
divine authority making the demand, any other justification given for a course of 
action lacks meaning. Without being convinced that a certain divinity can and will 
exercise authority, the demands made lack force. 25 
B. jesus and Practical justification 
Where tradition provides us evidence that Jesus defended his demands in this way, 
he is described as having appealed to the will of the Creator. 
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1. In Mark 10:9 
The prescription in Mark 10:9 relies for justification upon an explicit appeal: 0 ... 0 
9£0C; The reference to Cod immediately suggests that we are no longer 
on the same level of the appellate ladder of practical justification as we were in dis-
cussing the appeal to moral principles. We are, instead, dealing with a higher order of 
justification: an appeal to divine authority. 
This particular appeal rests upon two basic premises. One is a prior and general 
premise (here, that the intention or design of a creator is obligatory). The other is a 
positive belief about Cod (here, that he is creator of the marital relationship). An 
instance of what students of comparative religious ethics call "proprietary 
entitlement,"26 the logic of the appeal combines these premises and, if given full 
expression, would run as follows: 
Premise I: The intention or design of a creator is right or obligatory. 
Premise 2: Cod is the creator of not only men and women, but of the relation-
ship established between them (i.e., marriage). 
Premise 3: Cod intends that man and woman live in unbroken relationship to 
one another. 
Conclusion: Therefore, maintenance of that relationship is right or obligatory. 
Appealing as Jesus does to the authority of Cod as Creator, certain understandings of 
the logion are seen to be misleading. One such interpretation is that of the appeal as one 
made to 'Scripture against Scripture,' or Schnft gegen Schrift, as some writers refer to it.27 As 
we have noted, in our judgment the references to Cen I :27 and 2:27 are both secondary. 
And even if the references were authentic, Jesus does not appear to place any weight on 
the argument that these texts (as opposed to Deut 24: I) provide an earlier, superior view 
of marriage28 or a view which must be harmonized with that of Deut 24 : 129 
Completely absent too is any indication that Jesus relied upon his own authority in 
justifying his demandJO The only evidence that might be adduced for the suggestion 
that he does is the bold character of the assertion itself. Nonetheless, it is upon Cod's 
authority that the weight of the demand rests. 
2. In Mark 2:27 
A similar justification is given by Jesus for his demand in Mark 2:27. There is only 
one difference. Rather than refer to Cod explicitly, Jesus uses a reverential circumlocu-
tion: 'Co Ota 'Cov 6: v9po:l1tov £YEV£'CO J1 Again, then, the logic of the 
appeal is that of proprietary entitlement: 
Premise I: The intention or design of a creator is right or obligatory. 
Premise 2: Cod is the Creator of the Sabbath.32 
Premise 3: Cod, in creating the Sabbath, intended that it be observed in such a 
way that man's (i.e., Israel's)l3 weI/-being would be enhanced. 
Conclusion: Therefore, that the Sabbath should be observed with a view to 
man's well-being is right or obligatory. 
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The logic of the appeal excludes alternative interpretations of the appeal from consid-
eration for the same reasons adduced in connection with Mk 10:9.34 
C The Significance of Mark 2.-27 and' 0.·9 
As brief as are the authorizing reasons offered here, their importance cannot be 
underestimated. 
1. For the Logic of Jesus' Ethic 
Together, these two passages preserve a record of Jesus validating his demands, 
using the highest order of appeal possible on that level. The only higher appeal that he 
might have made would have been to vindicate (rather than validate) his demand. That 
is, he might have attempted to defend belief in the divine authority back of his 
demand.3s This we have no record of him doing and, given the setting in which he 
taught and lived, he may not have found it necessary. 
In both prescriptions, then, we are in contact with that which is, logically speaking, 
most basic to the justification which Jesus gave for obedience to his demands: the per-
sonal authority of God, who is also creator. It is a finding which is all the more impor-
tant because it is drawn from sayings material in which both demand and the valida-
tion for the demand appear in single sayings. Separate traditions are not employed. 
The connection does not need to be reconstructed. 
To date, where scholars have argued that the Endzeit = Urzeit equation shaped the 
content of Jesus' demand, they have been forced to rely upon an argument from 
coherenceJ6 Here the connection is explicit and, using the insights of comparative reli-
gious ethics, we have been able to characterize the connection in more specific terms. 
2. For the Place of Torah in Jesus' Ethic 
The pattern of validation used by Jesus also explains why he does not begin in 
making his demands with the word of Torah itself. For him Torah is not identical in 
an absolute sense with the will of God. At times the two intersect, even though the 
demands of God's will may be impossible to specify using the Law. At other times the 
Law is emptied of continued relevance. In either case the issue is always the will of 
the Creator, which is the ultimate justification for the demands Jesus makes. Such an 
understanding of the place of divine authority in his demands and the resulting ambi-
guity in his attitude toward the Law should come as no surprise. 
IV. JESUS, JUDAISM AND THE LAW 
Judaism before, during, and after the life of Jesus manifests considerable variety of 
opinion on the place of the Law in the context of Jewish eschatological expectation. 
The schema used here for describing that variety has been developed by Gershom 
ScholemJ7 Scholem's interest is primarily in the development of the Messianic idea as 
reflected in rabbinic literature and, clearly, our interest lies elsewhere. Nonetheless, his 
schema is of considerable heuristic value: (I) Describing such expectations in terms of 
tendencies, Scholem recognizes eschatological beliefs ([ike many others) are often a 
matter of emphasis. Accordingly, his approach avoids the pitfalls of attempting to 
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assign particular approaches to one "party' or another. (2) Although his work is not of 
immediate relevance, it does establish that these emphases exist elsewhere, and there 
is no evidence to suggest that (at least in this case) there is any reason to make a spe-
cial exception for the material discussed here. (3) Scholem's schema is also at home 
with the notion that there was more than one Judaism in the ancient world. 
Specifically, he describes conservative, restorative and utopian tendencies in Jewish 
messianic thought. In what follows, we review those categories, focusing on the way 
in which Torah figures in these three visions of the future. The discussion is, necessari-
ly, illustrative in nature and is not meant to be exhaustive. 
A. Conservative, Restorative and Utopian Tendencies in Jewish Eschatology 
At times the literature can be conservative in its vision of the future. Seeking to pre-
serve that which already is, it sees even the eschatological future in these terms and, 
so, expects the Law and, in some instances, even the halakhah to be a part of that 
future. 38 So, for example, T. B. Sanhedrin 51 b reads as follows: 
R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha in the name of Rab: The 
Halachah is in accordance with the message sent by Rabin in the name of R. Jose 
b. Hanina. R. Joseph queried: (Do we need) to fix a halachah for the days of the 
Messiah? - Abaye answered: If so, we should not study the laws of sacrifices, as 
they are also only for the Messianic era. But we say, Study and receive reward. i. 
e. Learning has its own merit quite apart from any practical utility that may be 
derived therefrom 39 
Current circumstances may preclude the offering of sacrifices, but the halakhah gov-
erning sacrifice will govern eschatological practice40 It remains important even in the 
present and even now it is worthy of study. 
At other times the literature can be restorative in its outlook. Anticipating a return 
to or recreation of a past, ideal condition, the literature draws upon golden eras of the 
past, when obedience was a hallmark of man's relationship with Cod. It looks for a 
day when the demand of Torah or the will of Cod was at once lighter and heavier, 
because it is perfectly understood.41 
One portion of the Testament of Levi (apparently free at this point of later 
Christian interpolation42) envisions the future in just such terms: 
And he [i. e., the eschatological priest] shall open the gates of paradise; he shall 
remove the sword that has threatened since Adam, and he will grant to the 
saints to eat of the tree of life. The spirit of holiness shall be upon them43 
At still other times the literature can be utopian in its outlook, anticipating a state of 
affairs which never existed before. Abandoning models provided by either the past or 
the future, it can be "anarchic" in character, foreseeing a day when recourse to the 
familiar means of quantifying obedience will be unnecessary44 
Although a problematic passage, susceptible of a variety of interpretations, Jer 
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3 I :3 1-34 is clearly utopian in its outlook: 
Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant 
with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I 
made with their fathers when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the 
land of Egypt, my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband, says 
the Lord. But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel 
after those days, says the Lord : I will put my law within them, and I will write it 
upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no 
longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know 
the Lord," for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says 
the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more. 
These three tendencies rarely, if ever, find pure expression in Jewish literature. 
Combi nations are more frequently the rule, and no one group is always the pre-
dictable advocate of a particular vision of the future 4S For example, it is not at all clear 
that Jeremiah (or the later editor of his prophecies) foresees a future entirely without 
Torah in any external sense46 His vision, therefore might be characterized as one 
shaped by both utopian and conservative impulses. Nonetheless, the influence of dif-
fering visions of the future does exist. 
B. Restorative and Utopian Tendencies in the Eschatology of Jesus 
Against this background, Jesus need not be seen as a "conservative" in order to 
locate him within Judaism; nor do we need to characterize his approach as a singular 
exception to an otherwise uniformly "conservative' world. The apparent ambiguity of 
his approach to the Law and the justification which he gives for obedience to his 
demands suggest that his ethic had restorative inspiration and that he drew at length 
for such inspiration upon the creative role of God. Endzeit may not have been Urzeit 
for Jesus in that he draws at length upon the Genesis account, but the will of the 
Creator certainly appears to have been the will of the one who brings the end. 
However, the tendencies in his thought do not appear to have been limited to the 
restorative impulse. He foresees obedience of a kind for which the creation narratives 
may provide inspiration, but they do not completely delimit his demands. As such, he 
re-envisions the return of the Creator, embracing not only a restorative, but utopian 
vision of things to come. It is, nonetheless, a Jewish vision of the future and of the 
Law's place in it, shaped by hopes that had and would continue to shape those visions. 
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Of course, just how far these categories dominated Jesus' thought and even his 
approach to the Law remains to be seen. As was noted above, the results of this study 
are necessarily provisional. We have dealt with only a few of the sayings which might 
be discussed and with only prescriptive sayings. 
Nonetheless, the passages have strong claims to authenticity and provide an opportu-
nity to study not only the kind of demands which Jesus made, but the justifying rea-
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sons which he provided for those demands as well. Avoiding reconstruction across 
sayings and prescinding from an appeal to larger assumptions about the nature of the 
teaching of Jesus, this approach located at least one dimension of his approach to the 
Law squarely within the Judaisms of his day. 
The evidence described indicates that it is premature to argue that an eschatological 
understanding of Jesus should be replaced by a sapiential one:? Such a position not 
only fails to account for the kind of evidence described here, but overlooks the possi-
bility that Jesus could have been influenced by both realms of thought. 48 Any long-last-
ing contribution to the discussion of what the whole of Jesus' teaching may have 
looked like will need to avoid the simplistic and misleading "either/or" that has charac-
terized much of the past debate. 
The logic of the demands made by Jesus also presents a challenge to the ··either/or'· 
approach which has characterized the discussion of parts of Jesus' teaching - specifi-
cally, the relationship between ethics and eschatology in his thought. The insights of 
comparative religious ethics suggest that both divine authority and eschatological 
understandings of God are too closely intertwined in the demands which Jesus made 
to justify arguing that either "theo-Iogy' or oIeschato-logy" is more basic to the teaching 
of Jesus. The former might be argued to be logically prior, but the latter proves to be a 
part of the most basic appeals which Jesus makes when justifying his demands:o 
As such the ethic of Jesus is at odds with conservative understandings of God's will 
and breaks in upon attempts to capture the will of God in those terms. However, the 
"loyal opposition'· Jesus practices is not opposition for opposition's sake. In the 
Kingdom one confronts again and again the will of the God who was, who is and 
who will be. 
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